Let me say something quick and temporary. I will post a more reflective comment after I watch the game again. I was way too tense as I watched it live, and cannot trust the accuracy of my perceptions.
Perhaps this is how I should begin. I was too tense during the game, and I shouldn't have been so tense. Please do not get me wrong. Portugal is a very good team, with some great players. Too defensive for my taste, but a very serious opponent anyway.
Spain, however, allowed way too many scoring opportunities. Spain should have had a much tighter control over the game. The line-up, once again, was the problem. More midfielders were badly needed. Xavi Hernández was isolated somewhere between three or five Portuguese players. Iniesta tried to help out, but it was not enough for reaching numerical parity in the midfield. And once again, today Xavi Hernández was also forced to receive the ball facing his own goalie.
Spain´s scoring opportunities were all from far away, at least until Villa scored. This tells how hard it was for the Spainards to cut through the Portuguese defensive wall. The problem was not lack of skill. The problem was that the Spaniards were outnumbered as soon as they would step on the Portuguese first 1/3 of the field.
In this scenario, Spain lost the ball in dangerous areas too many times. The first half left everyone with the feeling that scoring was closer for Portugal than for Spain.
Thank goodness that Villa scored first. After Spain scored, everything was easier for the Spaniards. Hidding the ball and making Portugal chase it was easy breezy. Further scoring opportunities started to show up.
Surprisingly enough, Portugal surrendered. Only in the last 10 minutes of the game Portugal re-attempted to score, but by then it was a little too little, a little too late.
The Spanish press at this hour could not be happier and more praiseworthy. The coach gets most of the laurels for playing Llorente and supposedly changing the dynamics of the game with this decision. I will have to see the game again to have a better judgment about it. The fact of the matter is that Del Bosque is the true winner of this game, and thus he will feel reinforced in his views. The passing game is probably over for Spain in this World Cup, at least at its highest. The downgraded passing game played by Del Bosque´s strategy might be enough to beat Paraguay, and possibly also to beat Argentina. I am not quite sure that it can beat Germany or Brazil, though, unless Del Bosque upgrades it back to its fullest expression.
martes, 29 de junio de 2010
lunes, 28 de junio de 2010
Just 10 Minutes Said It All
Let's watch here a sample of what I have been arguing in this blog. From the minute that Fábregas replaced Torres, in the second half against Chile, up till the minute when both teams agreed on calling it a game ahead of time, 10 minutes elapsed when Spain swiped Chile away. At last, Spain was playing with 5 midfielders.
As soon as Bielsa, the bright coach of Chile, noticed the replacement, he ordered his players to back up a little. Spain was about to take over the midfield and establish numerical parity and technical dominance. Scoring opportunities started to show up with some consistency for Spain for the first time during the game-one scoring opportunity every 90 seconds! Spain missed them all, but not by much. All opportunites finished the play and forced Chile to start all over again.
Having a heavily populated midfield closer to the finish of every Spanish attacking play, Spain added one critical piece to its repertoire: it could press in packs every Chilean defender trying to start playing the ball after having recuperated it. You will see in the video that dangerous steals started to happen much too often for Chile's interest nearby the Chilean strike zone.
The Spanish team moved from dominated to dominating, from feeling overwhelmed to overwhelming its opponent, from occasional gust to wind storm. The Spanish players, who according to the Spanish press are purportedly in really bad physical shape, flourished like a recently watered rose plant, and regained the dynamism and joy that they had almost completely lost during this World Cup. Xavi Hernández smiled for the first time in two weeks, and he made smile the whole team with him.
These 10 minutes were quite telling: they told everyone who would listen that the Spanish players can still play their circus-quality passing game; they told that passing game is the indicated antidote against hard-working pressing teams; they told everyone that 10 minutes of passing game were worth in terms of depth and scoring opportunities more than 60 minutes of direct football; these 10 minutes reminded everyone that the best defense is a good attack; they told critics that the Spaniards have not been tired in previous games, just tied-up by systems that do not enhance their virtues. These 10 minutes told anyone who would listen that Spain can still play like this:
Just 10 minutes said it all, loud and clear. Will Del Bosque get the message?
As soon as Bielsa, the bright coach of Chile, noticed the replacement, he ordered his players to back up a little. Spain was about to take over the midfield and establish numerical parity and technical dominance. Scoring opportunities started to show up with some consistency for Spain for the first time during the game-one scoring opportunity every 90 seconds! Spain missed them all, but not by much. All opportunites finished the play and forced Chile to start all over again.
Having a heavily populated midfield closer to the finish of every Spanish attacking play, Spain added one critical piece to its repertoire: it could press in packs every Chilean defender trying to start playing the ball after having recuperated it. You will see in the video that dangerous steals started to happen much too often for Chile's interest nearby the Chilean strike zone.
The Spanish team moved from dominated to dominating, from feeling overwhelmed to overwhelming its opponent, from occasional gust to wind storm. The Spanish players, who according to the Spanish press are purportedly in really bad physical shape, flourished like a recently watered rose plant, and regained the dynamism and joy that they had almost completely lost during this World Cup. Xavi Hernández smiled for the first time in two weeks, and he made smile the whole team with him.
These 10 minutes were quite telling: they told everyone who would listen that the Spanish players can still play their circus-quality passing game; they told that passing game is the indicated antidote against hard-working pressing teams; they told everyone that 10 minutes of passing game were worth in terms of depth and scoring opportunities more than 60 minutes of direct football; these 10 minutes reminded everyone that the best defense is a good attack; they told critics that the Spaniards have not been tired in previous games, just tied-up by systems that do not enhance their virtues. These 10 minutes told anyone who would listen that Spain can still play like this:
Just 10 minutes said it all, loud and clear. Will Del Bosque get the message?
domingo, 27 de junio de 2010
Chile 1 - Spain 2
Spain is very confused. The players receive confusing signals from the coaching bench, and do not really know how to decode them. After all, Logic tells that from a contradiction anything is possible, because nothing follows.
The Spanish coach, Vicente del Bosque, pledges public loyalty again and again to his predecessor's passing game, the playing strategy and style that made Spain the current European Champion. And yet, Del Bosque designs a completely different strategy for every game and every opponent. This double message creates false expectations not only among the fans, but also among the players themselves.
Against Chile, the players were expected to overcome the aggressive Chilean pressing with skilfull and quick passing, and yet the coach did not provide the team with enough midfielders to do so; they were supposed to be on the offensive, and yet the coach played a defensive midfield; they were expected to have overwhelming ball posession, and yet the team was designed for direct football, for long vertical passing skipping the midfielders. The consequence of all this was severe underperformance.
Indeed, against Chile, Spain was designed to play direct football, once again. The Chilean press really hard all over the field. Chile moves forward in formation attempting to steal the ball. The Chilean pressing goes all the way up to their opponent's defensive line. This forces the Chilean defenders to move forward as well, in order for the team to be really compact and for the pressing to be effective. One way to play against this strategy is to send long passes over everyone's heads to the empty space left between the Chilean defenders and the Chilean goalie. This empty space amounts usually to somewhere between 1/3 and 1/2 of the entire field. The Chilean goalie is in charge of sweeping those passes by anticipation using his feet.
Spain gave up ball possession and attempted these long passes looking for Torres and Villa. This is how the first goal came about. It was the result of a somewhat fortunate play for the Spaniards, based however in pocking Chile's weakest point. Until Spain scored, Chile had given an excellent impression. It had prevented Spain from attacking, it had created one very clear scoring chance, and it was making the Spaniards feel really unconfortable on the field. However, the second Spanish shot meant a second goal, and that was it for Chile.
The two Spanish goals eased the Spanish anxiety significantly. The Spanish team, however, did not have a brilliant performance overall. Only when Torres was replaced by Fábregas in the second half, Spain had some minutes of exquisite football. They lasted as long everyone realized that if no one would score any more goals, both teams would most likely qualify for the next round. That was the end of it.
The Spanish underperformance may have had an additional origin. At this point into the competition, the early negative result and the load of criticism coming from the previous coach, Luis Aragonés, and also from the Spanish press may be paying a toll as well. Great boxing champions who get knocked-out for the first time are said not to be the same ever again. When a punch sends them to the ground, they stand up awaken from their invincibility fantasy. For the first time in their lives, they start wondering. They wonder whether or not they are as good as they thought they were. The wonder whether or not their best times are history now.
This seems to be Spain's state of mind these days. Knocked out by a less-talented team-the United States-in Spain's last participation in a play-off-format competition, it was beat again by a less-talented team-Switzerland-in the next play-off-format competition. In both defeats, Spain's opponent used exactly the same strategy. Both came after two long years of staying unbeat.
The American and Swiss punches made Spain wonder so much that against Honduras chaged its strategy completey, as it was changed again against Chile. Spain kept wondering so much that when Chile lost a player Spain decided not to attack anymore. It rather risked an accident that would send it to the ground for good than dare to be true to itself and play attacking football... lacking self-confidence.
Spain just earned much more than a qualification for the next round. It just earned some extra time. Spain has up till Tuesday to look inside, find itself and stop wondering. Today it found out that it still has its good old punch intact. If the coach could only make up his mind about which playing style fits the team best! If it could finally put all his bets on the passing game!
The Spanish coach, Vicente del Bosque, pledges public loyalty again and again to his predecessor's passing game, the playing strategy and style that made Spain the current European Champion. And yet, Del Bosque designs a completely different strategy for every game and every opponent. This double message creates false expectations not only among the fans, but also among the players themselves.
Against Chile, the players were expected to overcome the aggressive Chilean pressing with skilfull and quick passing, and yet the coach did not provide the team with enough midfielders to do so; they were supposed to be on the offensive, and yet the coach played a defensive midfield; they were expected to have overwhelming ball posession, and yet the team was designed for direct football, for long vertical passing skipping the midfielders. The consequence of all this was severe underperformance.
Indeed, against Chile, Spain was designed to play direct football, once again. The Chilean press really hard all over the field. Chile moves forward in formation attempting to steal the ball. The Chilean pressing goes all the way up to their opponent's defensive line. This forces the Chilean defenders to move forward as well, in order for the team to be really compact and for the pressing to be effective. One way to play against this strategy is to send long passes over everyone's heads to the empty space left between the Chilean defenders and the Chilean goalie. This empty space amounts usually to somewhere between 1/3 and 1/2 of the entire field. The Chilean goalie is in charge of sweeping those passes by anticipation using his feet.
Spain gave up ball possession and attempted these long passes looking for Torres and Villa. This is how the first goal came about. It was the result of a somewhat fortunate play for the Spaniards, based however in pocking Chile's weakest point. Until Spain scored, Chile had given an excellent impression. It had prevented Spain from attacking, it had created one very clear scoring chance, and it was making the Spaniards feel really unconfortable on the field. However, the second Spanish shot meant a second goal, and that was it for Chile.
The two Spanish goals eased the Spanish anxiety significantly. The Spanish team, however, did not have a brilliant performance overall. Only when Torres was replaced by Fábregas in the second half, Spain had some minutes of exquisite football. They lasted as long everyone realized that if no one would score any more goals, both teams would most likely qualify for the next round. That was the end of it.
The Spanish underperformance may have had an additional origin. At this point into the competition, the early negative result and the load of criticism coming from the previous coach, Luis Aragonés, and also from the Spanish press may be paying a toll as well. Great boxing champions who get knocked-out for the first time are said not to be the same ever again. When a punch sends them to the ground, they stand up awaken from their invincibility fantasy. For the first time in their lives, they start wondering. They wonder whether or not they are as good as they thought they were. The wonder whether or not their best times are history now.
This seems to be Spain's state of mind these days. Knocked out by a less-talented team-the United States-in Spain's last participation in a play-off-format competition, it was beat again by a less-talented team-Switzerland-in the next play-off-format competition. In both defeats, Spain's opponent used exactly the same strategy. Both came after two long years of staying unbeat.
The American and Swiss punches made Spain wonder so much that against Honduras chaged its strategy completey, as it was changed again against Chile. Spain kept wondering so much that when Chile lost a player Spain decided not to attack anymore. It rather risked an accident that would send it to the ground for good than dare to be true to itself and play attacking football... lacking self-confidence.
Spain just earned much more than a qualification for the next round. It just earned some extra time. Spain has up till Tuesday to look inside, find itself and stop wondering. Today it found out that it still has its good old punch intact. If the coach could only make up his mind about which playing style fits the team best! If it could finally put all his bets on the passing game!
miércoles, 23 de junio de 2010
Vertigo Can Be Deceiving
Statistics are often useless. Sometimes, however, they turn confusion into clarity. This time, a quick look at the compared statistics of both games played so far by Spain leads to an unexpected conclusion: the passing game against Switzerland had better attacking figures than the more direct and vertical playing style used against Honduras, evethough Switzerland was a much better organized, tougher team, that played a much more defensive game, whereas Honduras was a worse organized, more fragile team, that played a less defensive game. Indeed, the fact that against Honduras two goals were scored and the players performed at a higher rithm left a deceiving impression in most viewers, unfortunately including Spain's coach and a majority of the international and Spanish sports press.
For example, most viewers would have thought after watching the game against Honduras that Spain had shot many more times, and also more times on target, than it did against Switzerland. The stats, however, tell a different story. Spain only shot twice more against Honduras than it did against Switzerland (25 against 23 shots), in spite of the fact that Honduras defense was less strong and left many more empty spaces. Furthermore, Spain had one less shot on target agasint Honduras than it did against Switzerland (6 against 7). Spain shot once against the wood on each game, and missed a very clear one-to-one scoring opportunity against the goalie on each game as well.
Anyone who watched both games would be tempted to say that Spain gave more work to the Hondurian than to the Swiss goalkeeper, and yet, the Swiss goalie had more interventions during the game. Wouldn´t you have sworn that Spain had more corner kicks gainst Honduras? Well, it did not. The number of corner kicks for Spain on both games was exactly the same: 12.
Vertigo did not bring about better quantitative results to Spain than pause did. It brought about two goals. The big question remains--how many goals would have the passing game brought about to Spain had it been displayed against a very weak Honduras?
For example, most viewers would have thought after watching the game against Honduras that Spain had shot many more times, and also more times on target, than it did against Switzerland. The stats, however, tell a different story. Spain only shot twice more against Honduras than it did against Switzerland (25 against 23 shots), in spite of the fact that Honduras defense was less strong and left many more empty spaces. Furthermore, Spain had one less shot on target agasint Honduras than it did against Switzerland (6 against 7). Spain shot once against the wood on each game, and missed a very clear one-to-one scoring opportunity against the goalie on each game as well.
Anyone who watched both games would be tempted to say that Spain gave more work to the Hondurian than to the Swiss goalkeeper, and yet, the Swiss goalie had more interventions during the game. Wouldn´t you have sworn that Spain had more corner kicks gainst Honduras? Well, it did not. The number of corner kicks for Spain on both games was exactly the same: 12.
Vertigo did not bring about better quantitative results to Spain than pause did. It brought about two goals. The big question remains--how many goals would have the passing game brought about to Spain had it been displayed against a very weak Honduras?
martes, 22 de junio de 2010
Honduras 0 - Spain 2
The game starts and the kick off is for Spain: a long kick and the ball flies high up for 30 yards towards Torres' head, to no avail. That says it all from the get go. In this game there will be no passing game. Forget about associative football today. You are about to watch direct football. Today Spain will be Liverpool, Glasgow Celtic, Northern Ireland.
Del Bosque had announced before the game that no abrupt change of course would take place after the defeat against Switzerland. And yet, as far as I can remember, Spain had never played with the lay-out displayed against Honduras. It had never displayed an asymetric starting line-up, playing one true wing (Navas) with a false wing (Villa) together with a pure forward (Torres). Interestingly enough, this was precisely Real Madrid lay-out when Del Bosque coached it. On the right wing, a true wing player (Figo), one the left wing, a false wing player (Zidane), and then a pure forward (Raúl). What a coincidence! Isn't it? Del Bosque decided to experiment in the middle of the World Cup, when he had plenty of friendly games to do so. The passing game is over. What an abrupt change of course, indeed!
The strategy was crystal clear: either Xabi Alonso or Piqué were supposed to cross diagonal passes to the wings, the true and the false one, Navas and Villa, and they were asked to play one-to-one against the weak Honduran defenders and look for a shot or a cross into the box. The first goal was precisely a product of this strategy. Piqué crosses a long pass for Villa, some 30 yards away, who dribbles two defenders and scores before a third one.
Navas, following his coach's directions quite a bit too literally, put up a display of miscarried crosses from the right wing. Up to 12 naive crosses either for the Hondurans or for no one at all. The Spanish TV broadcaster was all excited after each cross. "Almost!", he would exclaim. "Great performance by Navas today!", praised again and again. Besides 12 inefficient crosses, Navas bounced the ball against his defender at least 5 times, and only got from all this effort two corner kicks. If we add to this two equally bad crosses by Sergio Ramos, then we have 15 completely wasted plays by Spain on the right wing. Un-freaking-believable!
The quiet guest to this nonsense was Xavi Hernández. All by himself, lonely as he could be, far away from every one, both midfielders and forwards, he had nobody to associate with. He spent most of the game watching how the ball would fly over his head, first from the defenders or Alonso to one wing or the other, and then from the wing to the Honduran box, that is to say, to the Honduran golie, to the head of some defender, or simply out of bounds. Xavi was not in charge of organizing the team, of timing the tempo, of giving assists. Today the best organizing midfielder in the world was assigned a secondary role that can be performed by a much less talented player. Perhaps this is why Del Bosque ended up sending Xavi to the bench.
I must confess that when I saw Fábregas ready to enter in the field, warming up jumping up and down by the fourth referee, I scratched my eyes. For a fraction of a second I thought that Del Bosque had seen the light. Honduras was extremely disorganized, there were lots of spaces opening all over the field, and Spain was wasting a lot of opportunities simply because it lacked a bit of pause and some easy passing as oppposed to so much vertigo. For a fraction of a second I thought that Del Bosque would replace Navas by Fábregas, so he could associate with Mata and Xavi and finally all three would put some very clear assists for Villa or for each other.
The illusion lasted just as long as the TV spotted Xavi head down, walking to be replaced, with the sadness of a goodbye in his face: goodbye to the passing game, goodbye to the European Champion. The predictable and flat Spain, the team that does not know whether to play with skill or strength, passing game or loads of Furia, is back. Good luck with that.
Del Bosque had announced before the game that no abrupt change of course would take place after the defeat against Switzerland. And yet, as far as I can remember, Spain had never played with the lay-out displayed against Honduras. It had never displayed an asymetric starting line-up, playing one true wing (Navas) with a false wing (Villa) together with a pure forward (Torres). Interestingly enough, this was precisely Real Madrid lay-out when Del Bosque coached it. On the right wing, a true wing player (Figo), one the left wing, a false wing player (Zidane), and then a pure forward (Raúl). What a coincidence! Isn't it? Del Bosque decided to experiment in the middle of the World Cup, when he had plenty of friendly games to do so. The passing game is over. What an abrupt change of course, indeed!
The strategy was crystal clear: either Xabi Alonso or Piqué were supposed to cross diagonal passes to the wings, the true and the false one, Navas and Villa, and they were asked to play one-to-one against the weak Honduran defenders and look for a shot or a cross into the box. The first goal was precisely a product of this strategy. Piqué crosses a long pass for Villa, some 30 yards away, who dribbles two defenders and scores before a third one.
Navas, following his coach's directions quite a bit too literally, put up a display of miscarried crosses from the right wing. Up to 12 naive crosses either for the Hondurans or for no one at all. The Spanish TV broadcaster was all excited after each cross. "Almost!", he would exclaim. "Great performance by Navas today!", praised again and again. Besides 12 inefficient crosses, Navas bounced the ball against his defender at least 5 times, and only got from all this effort two corner kicks. If we add to this two equally bad crosses by Sergio Ramos, then we have 15 completely wasted plays by Spain on the right wing. Un-freaking-believable!
The quiet guest to this nonsense was Xavi Hernández. All by himself, lonely as he could be, far away from every one, both midfielders and forwards, he had nobody to associate with. He spent most of the game watching how the ball would fly over his head, first from the defenders or Alonso to one wing or the other, and then from the wing to the Honduran box, that is to say, to the Honduran golie, to the head of some defender, or simply out of bounds. Xavi was not in charge of organizing the team, of timing the tempo, of giving assists. Today the best organizing midfielder in the world was assigned a secondary role that can be performed by a much less talented player. Perhaps this is why Del Bosque ended up sending Xavi to the bench.
I must confess that when I saw Fábregas ready to enter in the field, warming up jumping up and down by the fourth referee, I scratched my eyes. For a fraction of a second I thought that Del Bosque had seen the light. Honduras was extremely disorganized, there were lots of spaces opening all over the field, and Spain was wasting a lot of opportunities simply because it lacked a bit of pause and some easy passing as oppposed to so much vertigo. For a fraction of a second I thought that Del Bosque would replace Navas by Fábregas, so he could associate with Mata and Xavi and finally all three would put some very clear assists for Villa or for each other.
The illusion lasted just as long as the TV spotted Xavi head down, walking to be replaced, with the sadness of a goodbye in his face: goodbye to the passing game, goodbye to the European Champion. The predictable and flat Spain, the team that does not know whether to play with skill or strength, passing game or loads of Furia, is back. Good luck with that.
miércoles, 16 de junio de 2010
Switzerland 1 - Spain 0
Congrats to the Swiss. Now, let's see what we can make of this from Spain's perspective.
The Spanish media all seem to think a little too little, a little too fast. The dominant reaction in the Spanish media is that this was just an accident and the product of real bad luck. To elaborate on this the usual excuses are added: the Swiss goal was off-side (true, by the way); it also was incredibly fortunate; Switzerland should have played with 10 most of the game had the referee shown a red card to the Swiss player who being the last defender fouled Iniesta preventing him from scoring; at least one very clear penalty was not called against Switzerland; Spain shot 24 times, Switzerland only 8; Spain had overwhelming ball possession, around 73%...
All that might be true, and yet, it does not explain enough. Why did Spain only shoot 6 times on target? Why did it only have a small number of very clear scoring opportunities? Why didn't Spain sweep Switzerland away?
The few Spanish journalists who have some analysis capacity blame it, to my surprise, on the fact that Spain's fowards are not in prime condition. Villa is exhausted, literally burnt out, and Torres cannot play a full game yet, and when he plays his lack of competitive rithm becomes apparent.
When they stop focusing on individual names and they analyze the strategy, again to my surprise some very smart Spanish journalists wish Del Bosque would have brought in Llorente from the bench in order to head some of the dozens of crosses that were sent into the box by Navas and Ramos just to be bounced out by the Swiss defenders.
To me most of this is nonsense. I think that the factors that explain why Spain lost today are these instead:
(1) A problem of design: I cannot say it enough times in this blog. Spain ought to play only one destructive midfielder, either Xabi Alonso or Busquets. Pick your poison. In the Euro 2008 it was only Marcos Senna who played in that position-oh boy, do we miss him! Today Spain played with two players doing Senna's job (this is Alfredo Relaño's observation). This is how Del Bosque likes it. It has been the case since he got the job. However, against a team with 9 players defending behind the ball, like Switzerland plays, and most teams in this world cup sadly play like Switzerland, Spain does not need two defensive midfielders. Del Bosque is too conservative, too scared. Alonso and Busquets tend to occupy the same position, and thus they interfere with and bother each other. Besides, Spain misses this extra guy running between lines who would have the ability to break through, give the final pass or score himself. In three words, Spain misses Fábregas, or Mata, or someone playing as an extra creative midfielder and/or false forward. The passing game is much less fluid without this extra skillful guy. The magic of the passing game is very much in the number of midfielders on the pitch. Del Bosque does not seem to get that crucial lesson from Aragonés.
(2) A big mistake in the Plan B For situations like today´s after Switzerland scored, Del Bosque has been rehearsing in the previous friendly games with wings and a strong and tall forward, Llorente. I have written about this in my previous posts. Today it seemed that Llorente was going to play when Iniesta got injured and his position had to be filled in instead. Anyway, the initial plan remained, and Navas and Ramos crossed the ball dozens of times looking for Torres and Villa, paired with Swiss defenders big like mountains. I think that this is a huge mistake. Spain abandons then the impredictable passing game, where players interchange their positions, midfielders become forwards, forwards become wings and so on, for a much more classic, and also much more predictable and easy to defend lay-out. Spain wasted precious time, and precious plays, playing a game that any defending team would dream of.
(3) A problem of attitude: Spain played a little too relaxed until Switzerland scored, and then it played too anxious. It lacked a bit of the goal-cannibal instinct that has had in the past. Del Bosque repeatedly said before the game that Spain had to be patient, and the players interpreted that they could just pass the ball to each other endlessly without having the goal in their minds from the get go. Not that they were too cocky, but rather that they were too patient, as if they were sedated, without their usual and necessary adrenaline. Jorge Sámano's analysis at El Pais runs along these lines. I think that he is right. Well, only partially right. There are also other factors that he forgets.
(4) The psychological work is not right Today Silva, Villa, and Torres, and at times also Alonso, were too anxious, too speedy, lacking the necessary mental pause when it came to shooting and also when it came to giving the last pass. This is unusual in them, and it is not a good sign at all. Del Bosque has not done his job right in this respect. Their current state of anxiety explains better their underperformance than their lack of physical shape. Hopefully they will calm down after passing to the next round... if they pass.
Luis Aragonés' analysis after the game was probably more explicit than good politics would advice. Here is his view: "The Spanish players did not have enough speed when it came to occupying empty spaces in order to participate in the passing game. I would have played with only one destructive midfielder. Spain knew that Switzerland would give up on attacking, thus it should have played the first fifteen minutes with incredible intensity, trying to score fast. Instead, they were too convinced that they would win easily this game. This is partially the Spanish and international press fault. Too many compliments made the Spaniards not to play at 110% of their capabilities." I cannot be more in agreement with him, as usual. After all, he put together this playing style for this team, and someone else is messing with his toy.
¿Any reasons for optimism? Well, Spain played a good first half. As I said, it lacked ambition, but the passing game was pretty good. It was good enough to create a good number of scoring opportunities against a Swiss team that was physically still at its best. That is the way to go. I do think that replacing Xabi Alonso or Busquets by Fábregas would improve the performance even more, particularly when it comes to creating scorig opportunities. It would turn Spain's passing game into superb and incredibly dangerous as opposed to what we had today-just good and threatening. The probabilities that Del Bosque would do such a replacement are slim. Nevertheless, even with Alonso and Busquets together in the field Spain can still play really well and have enough opportunities to score. Hopefully in the next games some of those scoring opportunities will come true before Spain's rivals score first and lock-up their bunker's door. Then we may witness some Spainsh scoring galores. Or else, we may witness how a terrific team capable of the most-attractive-to-watch football in the tournament goes home ahead of time.
The Spanish media all seem to think a little too little, a little too fast. The dominant reaction in the Spanish media is that this was just an accident and the product of real bad luck. To elaborate on this the usual excuses are added: the Swiss goal was off-side (true, by the way); it also was incredibly fortunate; Switzerland should have played with 10 most of the game had the referee shown a red card to the Swiss player who being the last defender fouled Iniesta preventing him from scoring; at least one very clear penalty was not called against Switzerland; Spain shot 24 times, Switzerland only 8; Spain had overwhelming ball possession, around 73%...
All that might be true, and yet, it does not explain enough. Why did Spain only shoot 6 times on target? Why did it only have a small number of very clear scoring opportunities? Why didn't Spain sweep Switzerland away?
The few Spanish journalists who have some analysis capacity blame it, to my surprise, on the fact that Spain's fowards are not in prime condition. Villa is exhausted, literally burnt out, and Torres cannot play a full game yet, and when he plays his lack of competitive rithm becomes apparent.
When they stop focusing on individual names and they analyze the strategy, again to my surprise some very smart Spanish journalists wish Del Bosque would have brought in Llorente from the bench in order to head some of the dozens of crosses that were sent into the box by Navas and Ramos just to be bounced out by the Swiss defenders.
To me most of this is nonsense. I think that the factors that explain why Spain lost today are these instead:
(1) A problem of design: I cannot say it enough times in this blog. Spain ought to play only one destructive midfielder, either Xabi Alonso or Busquets. Pick your poison. In the Euro 2008 it was only Marcos Senna who played in that position-oh boy, do we miss him! Today Spain played with two players doing Senna's job (this is Alfredo Relaño's observation). This is how Del Bosque likes it. It has been the case since he got the job. However, against a team with 9 players defending behind the ball, like Switzerland plays, and most teams in this world cup sadly play like Switzerland, Spain does not need two defensive midfielders. Del Bosque is too conservative, too scared. Alonso and Busquets tend to occupy the same position, and thus they interfere with and bother each other. Besides, Spain misses this extra guy running between lines who would have the ability to break through, give the final pass or score himself. In three words, Spain misses Fábregas, or Mata, or someone playing as an extra creative midfielder and/or false forward. The passing game is much less fluid without this extra skillful guy. The magic of the passing game is very much in the number of midfielders on the pitch. Del Bosque does not seem to get that crucial lesson from Aragonés.
(2) A big mistake in the Plan B For situations like today´s after Switzerland scored, Del Bosque has been rehearsing in the previous friendly games with wings and a strong and tall forward, Llorente. I have written about this in my previous posts. Today it seemed that Llorente was going to play when Iniesta got injured and his position had to be filled in instead. Anyway, the initial plan remained, and Navas and Ramos crossed the ball dozens of times looking for Torres and Villa, paired with Swiss defenders big like mountains. I think that this is a huge mistake. Spain abandons then the impredictable passing game, where players interchange their positions, midfielders become forwards, forwards become wings and so on, for a much more classic, and also much more predictable and easy to defend lay-out. Spain wasted precious time, and precious plays, playing a game that any defending team would dream of.
(3) A problem of attitude: Spain played a little too relaxed until Switzerland scored, and then it played too anxious. It lacked a bit of the goal-cannibal instinct that has had in the past. Del Bosque repeatedly said before the game that Spain had to be patient, and the players interpreted that they could just pass the ball to each other endlessly without having the goal in their minds from the get go. Not that they were too cocky, but rather that they were too patient, as if they were sedated, without their usual and necessary adrenaline. Jorge Sámano's analysis at El Pais runs along these lines. I think that he is right. Well, only partially right. There are also other factors that he forgets.
(4) The psychological work is not right Today Silva, Villa, and Torres, and at times also Alonso, were too anxious, too speedy, lacking the necessary mental pause when it came to shooting and also when it came to giving the last pass. This is unusual in them, and it is not a good sign at all. Del Bosque has not done his job right in this respect. Their current state of anxiety explains better their underperformance than their lack of physical shape. Hopefully they will calm down after passing to the next round... if they pass.
Luis Aragonés' analysis after the game was probably more explicit than good politics would advice. Here is his view: "The Spanish players did not have enough speed when it came to occupying empty spaces in order to participate in the passing game. I would have played with only one destructive midfielder. Spain knew that Switzerland would give up on attacking, thus it should have played the first fifteen minutes with incredible intensity, trying to score fast. Instead, they were too convinced that they would win easily this game. This is partially the Spanish and international press fault. Too many compliments made the Spaniards not to play at 110% of their capabilities." I cannot be more in agreement with him, as usual. After all, he put together this playing style for this team, and someone else is messing with his toy.
¿Any reasons for optimism? Well, Spain played a good first half. As I said, it lacked ambition, but the passing game was pretty good. It was good enough to create a good number of scoring opportunities against a Swiss team that was physically still at its best. That is the way to go. I do think that replacing Xabi Alonso or Busquets by Fábregas would improve the performance even more, particularly when it comes to creating scorig opportunities. It would turn Spain's passing game into superb and incredibly dangerous as opposed to what we had today-just good and threatening. The probabilities that Del Bosque would do such a replacement are slim. Nevertheless, even with Alonso and Busquets together in the field Spain can still play really well and have enough opportunities to score. Hopefully in the next games some of those scoring opportunities will come true before Spain's rivals score first and lock-up their bunker's door. Then we may witness some Spainsh scoring galores. Or else, we may witness how a terrific team capable of the most-attractive-to-watch football in the tournament goes home ahead of time.
miércoles, 9 de junio de 2010
Spain 6 - Poland 0
¡What a great groove to fly with heading to South Africa!
Last night Spain confirmed that it has a very peculiar football style with no need of pure wing specialists to break through the wings:
and no need of a strong, tall and classic forward to break through a wall of strong and tall defenders:
¡Wow!¡Exhibition football!¡These guys are the Harlem Globbetrotters of international footballl! Jokes aside, this play shows that against big defenders you do not need tank forwards like Llorente to whom sending very predictable crosses. It can be just as good, if not a better idea, to play small unpredictable guys who play on the ground... until they pull a lob out of a magic hat. To tell the whole truth, in a competition game (as opposed to a friendly game) against a more experienced team, this play for the 2-0 would have probably been cut short with a foul at the box edge and a yellow card. It is also true that the number of yellow cards that Spain rivals will want to accumulate is finite, and fouls at the box edge are also good for Spain. Playing the ball on the ground pays off one way or the other.
Having said this, I must add that Llorente is much more than the tank forward that Del Bosque seems to see. He is very skilfull and agile. It is only a matter of time that he finds out the wonders of combining on the ground with the magic leprecauns. Perhaps even Navas will one of these days of practice get hit by the idea that he is not playing for Sevilla anymore. He may all of the sudden realize that he does not need to create the entire play all by himself. It may hit him that plays are created collectively in this magic world, and that when made by more than one leprechaun, after just one or two contacts with the ball, they become way more dangerous and productive. He is skillful enough to play this type of fast combinations. For now, it has been hard for him to get used to the style, as he retains the ball a little too long in his efforts to dribble the defender again and again until he can get the cross through. By then, the cross has become predictable. If only Del Bosque would let him know! Will he?
After the 2-0, the game was over. Poland stopped thinking that tying or winning the game was possible. It started to feel a little too overwhelmed by the Spanish ball possession. The heat of Murcia, the southern city where the game took place, may have also been felt a bit unbearable by the already defeated Polish spirit. The other four goals were good for getting more confidence, more coordination between team mates that need to get used to each other, getting in good shape and keeping the faith on associative football and also on the importance of long-distance shooting.
Perhaps the best piece of news in this game is something tha no media has talked about. Hidden behind the 6 goals scored by Spain, lies a 0 on the Spanish goal. This is to be explained by the lack of Polish scoring opportunities. A fact to be contrasted against the abundance of scoring opportunities enjoyed by the previous rivals of Spain in this preparation games, namely, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. Casillas had to save a good Polish shot, and that was it in the entire game. The Spanish pressing in the midfield recuperated the ball again and again long before Poland could even start to build up an attacking play. Way to go.
With midfielders and forwards helping so much in the defensive pressing when the team does not have the ball, and then the constant passing when it has it, Spain starts resembling a lot, really a lot, to the current European champion. It just needs a few little yet important details to get there. It would need to keep playing Capdevila on the left defense. It would need Xabi Alonso to play faster short passes (or even better, it would need Fábregas to play instead). It would need Sergio Ramos to keep his defensive position, as opposed to attacking like a beheaded chicken.
All this makes the team a little weaker. And yet, the rest of the engine is lubricated and today has way more confidence on its own possibilities than before the Euro2008. And, gee, they are still producing a lot of phenomenal football. Let's hope that it shall suffice with that.
Last night Spain confirmed that it has a very peculiar football style with no need of pure wing specialists to break through the wings:
and no need of a strong, tall and classic forward to break through a wall of strong and tall defenders:
¡Wow!¡Exhibition football!¡These guys are the Harlem Globbetrotters of international footballl! Jokes aside, this play shows that against big defenders you do not need tank forwards like Llorente to whom sending very predictable crosses. It can be just as good, if not a better idea, to play small unpredictable guys who play on the ground... until they pull a lob out of a magic hat. To tell the whole truth, in a competition game (as opposed to a friendly game) against a more experienced team, this play for the 2-0 would have probably been cut short with a foul at the box edge and a yellow card. It is also true that the number of yellow cards that Spain rivals will want to accumulate is finite, and fouls at the box edge are also good for Spain. Playing the ball on the ground pays off one way or the other.
Having said this, I must add that Llorente is much more than the tank forward that Del Bosque seems to see. He is very skilfull and agile. It is only a matter of time that he finds out the wonders of combining on the ground with the magic leprecauns. Perhaps even Navas will one of these days of practice get hit by the idea that he is not playing for Sevilla anymore. He may all of the sudden realize that he does not need to create the entire play all by himself. It may hit him that plays are created collectively in this magic world, and that when made by more than one leprechaun, after just one or two contacts with the ball, they become way more dangerous and productive. He is skillful enough to play this type of fast combinations. For now, it has been hard for him to get used to the style, as he retains the ball a little too long in his efforts to dribble the defender again and again until he can get the cross through. By then, the cross has become predictable. If only Del Bosque would let him know! Will he?
After the 2-0, the game was over. Poland stopped thinking that tying or winning the game was possible. It started to feel a little too overwhelmed by the Spanish ball possession. The heat of Murcia, the southern city where the game took place, may have also been felt a bit unbearable by the already defeated Polish spirit. The other four goals were good for getting more confidence, more coordination between team mates that need to get used to each other, getting in good shape and keeping the faith on associative football and also on the importance of long-distance shooting.
Perhaps the best piece of news in this game is something tha no media has talked about. Hidden behind the 6 goals scored by Spain, lies a 0 on the Spanish goal. This is to be explained by the lack of Polish scoring opportunities. A fact to be contrasted against the abundance of scoring opportunities enjoyed by the previous rivals of Spain in this preparation games, namely, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. Casillas had to save a good Polish shot, and that was it in the entire game. The Spanish pressing in the midfield recuperated the ball again and again long before Poland could even start to build up an attacking play. Way to go.
With midfielders and forwards helping so much in the defensive pressing when the team does not have the ball, and then the constant passing when it has it, Spain starts resembling a lot, really a lot, to the current European champion. It just needs a few little yet important details to get there. It would need to keep playing Capdevila on the left defense. It would need Xabi Alonso to play faster short passes (or even better, it would need Fábregas to play instead). It would need Sergio Ramos to keep his defensive position, as opposed to attacking like a beheaded chicken.
All this makes the team a little weaker. And yet, the rest of the engine is lubricated and today has way more confidence on its own possibilities than before the Euro2008. And, gee, they are still producing a lot of phenomenal football. Let's hope that it shall suffice with that.
martes, 1 de junio de 2010
Has Del Bosque fully embraced associative football?
For the Spanish national team, associative football was the legacy of Luis Aragonés, the coach that led Spain to win the Euro2008. The new national coach, Vicente Del Bosque, has seemed reluctant to fully embrace this style based on constant passing since he got the job.
When attacking, Del Bosque prefers a more vertical football. He wants faster passing (thus risking the ball a little more, and losing more balls per game) and he would love playing with wings. He prefers playing two destructive midfielders on the field (typically Busquets and Xabi Alonso), as opposed to playing just one. He'd rather play muscular Arbeloa on the defensive left side, eventhough he is a right-footer, than the lefty, better passer, better scorer, and more skillful yet not so strong Capdevilla. And so on. Del Bosque leans towards more conservative choices whenever he is faced with two options, and yet, his teams receive more goals against than Luis Aragonés'.
Why is that? Well, Del Bosque has not fully embraced the defensive style that must go with associative football either. Under associative football there is no choice: Spain must defend by keeping the ball and finishing each play, however long it may need to be, with a shot. That is why having Capdevilla is defensely better than having Arbeloa. That is why having Xavi Hernández lead the team accompanied by just one defensive midfielder is better than playing with two defensive midfielders and Xavi Hernández closer to Villa and Torres. It is better because in this way Spain losses less balls, and attacks more effectively, and it becomes safer overall.
The good news is that in the game against Saudi Arabia, the A team played decent although still a bit too slow associative football. Let´s keep an eye on this.
When attacking, Del Bosque prefers a more vertical football. He wants faster passing (thus risking the ball a little more, and losing more balls per game) and he would love playing with wings. He prefers playing two destructive midfielders on the field (typically Busquets and Xabi Alonso), as opposed to playing just one. He'd rather play muscular Arbeloa on the defensive left side, eventhough he is a right-footer, than the lefty, better passer, better scorer, and more skillful yet not so strong Capdevilla. And so on. Del Bosque leans towards more conservative choices whenever he is faced with two options, and yet, his teams receive more goals against than Luis Aragonés'.
Why is that? Well, Del Bosque has not fully embraced the defensive style that must go with associative football either. Under associative football there is no choice: Spain must defend by keeping the ball and finishing each play, however long it may need to be, with a shot. That is why having Capdevilla is defensely better than having Arbeloa. That is why having Xavi Hernández lead the team accompanied by just one defensive midfielder is better than playing with two defensive midfielders and Xavi Hernández closer to Villa and Torres. It is better because in this way Spain losses less balls, and attacks more effectively, and it becomes safer overall.
The good news is that in the game against Saudi Arabia, the A team played decent although still a bit too slow associative football. Let´s keep an eye on this.
Does Xabi Alonso fit in?
Xabi Alonso is a great player, no question about it. However, his long passes are best suited for a very vertical playing style, such as Liverpool's or Real Madrid's. Luis Aragonés during the Euro2008 used to play Alonso in the second halves, when Spain was already leading the score. His mission was to launch counter attacks with his long passes.
When he plays for Spain in the starting team, he has a tendency to become very disruptive for the combinative style of his team mates. Every player in the team but him is trying to move the ball quickly in short pasess. When the ball reaches Alonso, he would risk it, and often lose it, with a 40m pass. When he has the option of passing the ball quickly to an open team mate close to him, he often waits a little too long. He first has this urge to look for a superb a master pass. When he does not see it possible, then he makes the easy, shorter pass... a little too late. I only wish that he could accept a more modest role in the team and keep the ball circulating quickly. He can do that. He is really versatile. In the end, it is not entirely his fault. He has a coach, Del Bosque, that must persuade him of the importance of playing quick short passes. If only Del Bosque fully believed in the efectiveness of associative football as much as Luis Aragonés did!
Here you have a selection of bad passes (12 in total) and a few extra bad choices Xabi made in the only game Spain lost in the last four years, against the US. It is probably unfair. He does not normally miss so many passes, but it gives you an idea of his tendency to go too direct, as opposed to passing quickly to the closest team mate. The person who did the compliation seems to have a similar opinion. He is being sarcastic with the title "mejores jugadas". Check it out.
To be fair, here you have some good long passes of his:
Del Bosque has played him from the get go, together with another defensive midfielder, either Busquets or Senna. The alternative to playing Alonso would be to play a more combinative player, Fábregas, or else an extra forward instead. Busquets would then have to play right in front of the 2 central defenders, and Xavi Hernández together with Cesc Fábregas in the creative midfield accompanied by Silva and Iniesta, and just one fordward. Or else, only Xavi Hernández as a organizing midfielder (Fábregas on the bench), plus Silva and Iniesta, plus two forwards, Torres and Villa, together.
The problem with all this is that Del Bosque is in love with Xabi Alonso. I am too, by the way, if only he could fully adapt to the collective style!
The good news is that Alonso played much more associatively against Saudi Arabia. He seemed less interested in impressing everyone with his long passes, and much more involved in the collective enterprise of associative football. There are reasons for hope. With such great players, there always are.
If you can read in Spanish, check this out about the purported incompatibility between Xabi Alonso and Xavi Hernández: http://www.as.com/opinion/articulo/raro-xabi-xavi-peguen/dasopi/20090813dasdaiopi_3/Tes
When he plays for Spain in the starting team, he has a tendency to become very disruptive for the combinative style of his team mates. Every player in the team but him is trying to move the ball quickly in short pasess. When the ball reaches Alonso, he would risk it, and often lose it, with a 40m pass. When he has the option of passing the ball quickly to an open team mate close to him, he often waits a little too long. He first has this urge to look for a superb a master pass. When he does not see it possible, then he makes the easy, shorter pass... a little too late. I only wish that he could accept a more modest role in the team and keep the ball circulating quickly. He can do that. He is really versatile. In the end, it is not entirely his fault. He has a coach, Del Bosque, that must persuade him of the importance of playing quick short passes. If only Del Bosque fully believed in the efectiveness of associative football as much as Luis Aragonés did!
Here you have a selection of bad passes (12 in total) and a few extra bad choices Xabi made in the only game Spain lost in the last four years, against the US. It is probably unfair. He does not normally miss so many passes, but it gives you an idea of his tendency to go too direct, as opposed to passing quickly to the closest team mate. The person who did the compliation seems to have a similar opinion. He is being sarcastic with the title "mejores jugadas". Check it out.
To be fair, here you have some good long passes of his:
Del Bosque has played him from the get go, together with another defensive midfielder, either Busquets or Senna. The alternative to playing Alonso would be to play a more combinative player, Fábregas, or else an extra forward instead. Busquets would then have to play right in front of the 2 central defenders, and Xavi Hernández together with Cesc Fábregas in the creative midfield accompanied by Silva and Iniesta, and just one fordward. Or else, only Xavi Hernández as a organizing midfielder (Fábregas on the bench), plus Silva and Iniesta, plus two forwards, Torres and Villa, together.
The problem with all this is that Del Bosque is in love with Xabi Alonso. I am too, by the way, if only he could fully adapt to the collective style!
The good news is that Alonso played much more associatively against Saudi Arabia. He seemed less interested in impressing everyone with his long passes, and much more involved in the collective enterprise of associative football. There are reasons for hope. With such great players, there always are.
If you can read in Spanish, check this out about the purported incompatibility between Xabi Alonso and Xavi Hernández: http://www.as.com/opinion/articulo/raro-xabi-xavi-peguen/dasopi/20090813dasdaiopi_3/Tes
What is to like about associative football?
Associative football is like a ballet or a well coorditante orchestra of 11 skillful players, rithmically and patiently passing the ball as they look for a crack in the opponent´s defense. In a football increasingly dominated by the most athletic teams, associative football challenges this dominant trend by betting for skill, ball possession, and constant attack. It is both a risky bet and beautiful to watch.
Putting together a full national team of players able to play like this, including the guys on the bench, is no easy task. Very few countries in the world can do it. More importantly, very few national coaches dare to do it. Very skillful players are needed, and skillful players are usually small guys. A team playing in this way is a physically light-weight team. It risks getting abused by more muscular teams. Defensively, a light-weight team is also at risk, in danger of being overpowered by stronger and taller teams. Here you can see why this bet is so unusual, and so risky.
Notice that for associative football to take place, each player in the team must have the ability to pass the ball immediately. This is the most valuable skill necessary for associative football-speed of mind. This is hard. Really hard. Most players professional and non-professional, need to stop the ball when they receive it, then rise their head, then lower it and take a look at the ball again, then kick it forward or backwards, then rise the head again and pass the ball. Way too slow! Not good for associative football. The ball needs to circulate as fast as possible. The ball should run more than the players, not the other way around. Only in this way the opponent´s defense can get out of place, distracted, cracked, and scoring becomes possible. Again, this is not achievable by just any team. To put it bluntly-any team can successfully play defensive football, yet only a very good team can play associative football.
Spain is not the first team ever that plays in this way. Brazil national team has played in a slower motion, but very similar way, for decades. In this World Cup it will not play in this way, though. Dunga, the Brazilian coach, favors a more physical style-press, steal and run. Played in faster and more dynamic way, it is prohably the Netherlands in the World Cup of 1974 the point of reference. Ajax of Amsterdam, Arsenal and Barcelona are the three football clubs in Europe that play in this way. And then the Spanish national team, starting about 3 years ago. It all started with this Denmark vs. Spain in October 2007, and in particular, with this goal, scored only after 28 consecutive passes:
There are other very difficult and very effective ways to play football. Italian defensive football played at its best is an art. British and Irish push-and-run direct football played at its best is also an art. Each of these styles require a very different type of player. Each has its followers and its own beauty too.
Putting together a full national team of players able to play like this, including the guys on the bench, is no easy task. Very few countries in the world can do it. More importantly, very few national coaches dare to do it. Very skillful players are needed, and skillful players are usually small guys. A team playing in this way is a physically light-weight team. It risks getting abused by more muscular teams. Defensively, a light-weight team is also at risk, in danger of being overpowered by stronger and taller teams. Here you can see why this bet is so unusual, and so risky.
Notice that for associative football to take place, each player in the team must have the ability to pass the ball immediately. This is the most valuable skill necessary for associative football-speed of mind. This is hard. Really hard. Most players professional and non-professional, need to stop the ball when they receive it, then rise their head, then lower it and take a look at the ball again, then kick it forward or backwards, then rise the head again and pass the ball. Way too slow! Not good for associative football. The ball needs to circulate as fast as possible. The ball should run more than the players, not the other way around. Only in this way the opponent´s defense can get out of place, distracted, cracked, and scoring becomes possible. Again, this is not achievable by just any team. To put it bluntly-any team can successfully play defensive football, yet only a very good team can play associative football.
Spain is not the first team ever that plays in this way. Brazil national team has played in a slower motion, but very similar way, for decades. In this World Cup it will not play in this way, though. Dunga, the Brazilian coach, favors a more physical style-press, steal and run. Played in faster and more dynamic way, it is prohably the Netherlands in the World Cup of 1974 the point of reference. Ajax of Amsterdam, Arsenal and Barcelona are the three football clubs in Europe that play in this way. And then the Spanish national team, starting about 3 years ago. It all started with this Denmark vs. Spain in October 2007, and in particular, with this goal, scored only after 28 consecutive passes:
There are other very difficult and very effective ways to play football. Italian defensive football played at its best is an art. British and Irish push-and-run direct football played at its best is also an art. Each of these styles require a very different type of player. Each has its followers and its own beauty too.
A few acknowledgments for Spain's associative football
Spain would not play associative football had Barcelona not played it for the last two decades with great success.
And Barcelona would not play it had Johan Cruyff in the 1990s not imposed it as the compulsory style for all divisions of Barcelona, from little kids to grown up pros. Cruyff probably also owes a lot to his former coach, Rinus Mitchel.
The last two brilliant years of Guardiola as a Barcelona coach have also been critical to persuade Del Bosque that this style that he is not so fond of can be just as effective, if not more effective, than any other approach.
Barcelona plays with fantastic footballers bred in town in the younger divisions, such as Valdés, Piqué, Puyol, Xavi, Busquets, Iniesta, Messi, Pedro or Bojan. As any other private and wealthy club, Barcelona can also afford to fill in the remaining possitions with players tha would fit the team style, such as Márquez, Alves, Yaya Touré, Keita, Henry, and Ibrahimovic...
A general acknowledgment is also due to Latin American football, in particular, Brazilian football. From Mexico to Patagonia, all Latin America speaks a smiliar football language--a big appreciation for a very skilfull, associative, and aesthetic way of playing. Thousands of Latin American players have played in the Spanish professional league over the years. Besides, Spain feels very strongly emotionally and culturally connected to Latin America. The Spanish football taste has always been influenced by this connection.
Spain as a national team only played in this combinative style very recently, under the coaching of Luis Aragonés. In the history of Spanish coaching, Aragonés is probably one of the most pragmatic and least style oriented of all coaches. A lover of good defense strategy, steal and run, he was well known for critizicing players who would try to play "pretty", as opposed to "playing well". Who would have thought that he would end up implementing the most beautiful style Spain ever played!
After two years of coaching the Spanish national team without any major success, Aragonés slowly but surely veered towards playing with his best players all at once, without sparing a single one on the bench. The problem was that they all shared a very similar profile: midfielder, small, skillful, associative, imaginative, not very muscular...
Acknowledging and embracing the abundance of this type of player in Spain was not an easy task. National coaches in the past, including Aragonés himself, had shared a common fear: if Spain plays with all the talented guys at once, it may get abused by the muscle power of all other teams. All coaches in the past had chosen to "balance" the national team by sitting down some of the best players on the bech and introducing some muscle instead. This led to decades of a confusing style, at times muscular, at times skillful, but never fully either one.
Luis Aragonés was the first coach to come to the conclusion that the problem of Spain in the past had been one of split-personality: it had aspired to play beautiful football but never played its best players all at once; it bred talent but played with muscle. For the first time in the history of the Spanish team, Aragonés dared to play all the talented little people together, and to make them play the style that fits them best, a style that no Aragonés team in his long coaching career had ever played before-combinative football.
Thank you, Luis, for daring. Thank you, Johan and Barcelona, for your vision. Thank you Rinus, for opening the way.
And Barcelona would not play it had Johan Cruyff in the 1990s not imposed it as the compulsory style for all divisions of Barcelona, from little kids to grown up pros. Cruyff probably also owes a lot to his former coach, Rinus Mitchel.
The last two brilliant years of Guardiola as a Barcelona coach have also been critical to persuade Del Bosque that this style that he is not so fond of can be just as effective, if not more effective, than any other approach.
Barcelona plays with fantastic footballers bred in town in the younger divisions, such as Valdés, Piqué, Puyol, Xavi, Busquets, Iniesta, Messi, Pedro or Bojan. As any other private and wealthy club, Barcelona can also afford to fill in the remaining possitions with players tha would fit the team style, such as Márquez, Alves, Yaya Touré, Keita, Henry, and Ibrahimovic...
A general acknowledgment is also due to Latin American football, in particular, Brazilian football. From Mexico to Patagonia, all Latin America speaks a smiliar football language--a big appreciation for a very skilfull, associative, and aesthetic way of playing. Thousands of Latin American players have played in the Spanish professional league over the years. Besides, Spain feels very strongly emotionally and culturally connected to Latin America. The Spanish football taste has always been influenced by this connection.
Spain as a national team only played in this combinative style very recently, under the coaching of Luis Aragonés. In the history of Spanish coaching, Aragonés is probably one of the most pragmatic and least style oriented of all coaches. A lover of good defense strategy, steal and run, he was well known for critizicing players who would try to play "pretty", as opposed to "playing well". Who would have thought that he would end up implementing the most beautiful style Spain ever played!
After two years of coaching the Spanish national team without any major success, Aragonés slowly but surely veered towards playing with his best players all at once, without sparing a single one on the bench. The problem was that they all shared a very similar profile: midfielder, small, skillful, associative, imaginative, not very muscular...
Acknowledging and embracing the abundance of this type of player in Spain was not an easy task. National coaches in the past, including Aragonés himself, had shared a common fear: if Spain plays with all the talented guys at once, it may get abused by the muscle power of all other teams. All coaches in the past had chosen to "balance" the national team by sitting down some of the best players on the bech and introducing some muscle instead. This led to decades of a confusing style, at times muscular, at times skillful, but never fully either one.
Luis Aragonés was the first coach to come to the conclusion that the problem of Spain in the past had been one of split-personality: it had aspired to play beautiful football but never played its best players all at once; it bred talent but played with muscle. For the first time in the history of the Spanish team, Aragonés dared to play all the talented little people together, and to make them play the style that fits them best, a style that no Aragonés team in his long coaching career had ever played before-combinative football.
Thank you, Luis, for daring. Thank you, Johan and Barcelona, for your vision. Thank you Rinus, for opening the way.
Switzerland vs. Spain, Wednesday, June 16, 2010, Durban, South Africa
Opening game for Spain and Switzerland in the tournament. This will be a major test for Spain.
Switzerland is coached by Ottmar Hitzfeld, a phe-no-me-nal coach. Hitzfeld won two European Championships (nowaday called Champions Leagues) with two different clubs, Borusia Dortmund (1997) and Bayern Munich (2001). Only two more coaches in the history of European football have accomplished such an achievement (Ernst Happoel and Jose Mourinho).
It will be interesting to see what strategy he uses against Spain. Let me make an educated guess--tight defense and one player forward. That is, the way the US beat Spain in the ConfeCup, and the way that Inter Milan beat Barcelona in the last Champions Leage. Defense, defense, defense, and direct football whenever they steal the ball. With this strategy, Hitzfeld will settle for a tie and hope for a lonely goal in his favor. He will not give up on the possibility of scoring in a counter-attack, a free kick or a shot from far away. For example, Ilner scored from far away in a friendly game against Italy a few days ago
The Swiss defensive mistake in the Italian goal is also quite remarkable.
Thus Switzerland will most likely test Spain's ability to score against a tight defense put up by a muscular, very disciplined, and very well-organized team. Needless to say, if Spain scores first, then the game will change completely.
Spain will meet with this type of defensive strategy again and again in the tournament. Italy and Brazil will eventually play Spain in the exact same way, possibly with the defensive line a little further away from their goalie than Switzerland can afford. It is up to Del Bosque to rehearse as we speak the kind of attacking moves that can cut throught this kind of ultra-defensive strategy. Constant movements without the ball and passing the ball fast are the two mantras that Spain must keep repeating to itself. If it stays true to them, it should beat Switzerland. As for Brazil and Italy... we will see in due time.
Switzerland is coached by Ottmar Hitzfeld, a phe-no-me-nal coach. Hitzfeld won two European Championships (nowaday called Champions Leagues) with two different clubs, Borusia Dortmund (1997) and Bayern Munich (2001). Only two more coaches in the history of European football have accomplished such an achievement (Ernst Happoel and Jose Mourinho).
It will be interesting to see what strategy he uses against Spain. Let me make an educated guess--tight defense and one player forward. That is, the way the US beat Spain in the ConfeCup, and the way that Inter Milan beat Barcelona in the last Champions Leage. Defense, defense, defense, and direct football whenever they steal the ball. With this strategy, Hitzfeld will settle for a tie and hope for a lonely goal in his favor. He will not give up on the possibility of scoring in a counter-attack, a free kick or a shot from far away. For example, Ilner scored from far away in a friendly game against Italy a few days ago
The Swiss defensive mistake in the Italian goal is also quite remarkable.
Thus Switzerland will most likely test Spain's ability to score against a tight defense put up by a muscular, very disciplined, and very well-organized team. Needless to say, if Spain scores first, then the game will change completely.
Spain will meet with this type of defensive strategy again and again in the tournament. Italy and Brazil will eventually play Spain in the exact same way, possibly with the defensive line a little further away from their goalie than Switzerland can afford. It is up to Del Bosque to rehearse as we speak the kind of attacking moves that can cut throught this kind of ultra-defensive strategy. Constant movements without the ball and passing the ball fast are the two mantras that Spain must keep repeating to itself. If it stays true to them, it should beat Switzerland. As for Brazil and Italy... we will see in due time.
Honduras vs. Spain, Monday, June 21, 2010
Honduras has the Latin American taste for skill plus some muscle. Núñez can give good assists, and Wilson Palacios is besides a very strong guy a very skillful player. Against Spain, Honduras will probably take one step back and will look for quick attacking transitions, trying to launch Pavón, Costly or Suazo, very fast runners. If the Catrachos (Hondurans) try to pass the ball to each other too much, instead of quickly launching their forwards, they will loose it right away.
In other words, presumably Honduras will suffer with the Spanish pressure in the midfield. Honduras players will have to move the ball much faster than most of them are used to, or else Spain will steal it pretty quickly. Another challenge for Honduras will be to keep their defensive order and discipline before the Spanish dynamism and passing game. If Honduras is able to keep defenively organized for the entire game and manages to send fast and direct attacks, it may have some chances.
Honduras scored some impressive goals during the qualification round to the World Cup, particularly some signed by Costly from far away
I am certain that any one who has followed Honduras during the qualification round can offer more details.
In other words, presumably Honduras will suffer with the Spanish pressure in the midfield. Honduras players will have to move the ball much faster than most of them are used to, or else Spain will steal it pretty quickly. Another challenge for Honduras will be to keep their defensive order and discipline before the Spanish dynamism and passing game. If Honduras is able to keep defenively organized for the entire game and manages to send fast and direct attacks, it may have some chances.
Honduras scored some impressive goals during the qualification round to the World Cup, particularly some signed by Costly from far away
I am certain that any one who has followed Honduras during the qualification round can offer more details.
Spain vs. Chile, Friday june 25th, pre-game thoughts
Chile is a fantastic team, coached by a great Argentine coach, Marcelo Bielsa.
Spain played Chile in November 2008 in a friendly game and won only after a big effort. The final result, 3-0, was misleading. Chile played a phenomenal first half, particularly in pressing Spain in the midfield. Brilliant job, really. Chile missed two very clear scoring opportunities, the first one when the game was 0 - 0, and received two silly goals against, one after a dumb penalty and another one after the ball hit the back of a Chilean defender
Chile also run an excellent qualifying tournament for the World Cup 2010. It qualified second after Brasil.
Chile vs. Spain is the last game of Group H. By the time they meet, both teams may have been qualified for the next round. By then it will be also known for sure how Brazil did in its group. Mind you that the winner of Brazil group will play the second of group H (probably either Chile or Spain), and vice-versa. Spain may very well play with its B team against Chile, just as it did in the Euro2008 against Greece. This gave some very necessary rest to the A team as it kept in good shape and highly motivated the B players. If Spain plays with its A team, Chile can still beat Spain. If Spain plays with its B team, it is even more possible. Thus Chile may very well qualify first of Group H, and Spain may have to play Brazil in the first play-off.
Watch Chile. It may go far into the play-offs. It does not play Spain´s associative foothball, but it plays excellent football too.
Spain played Chile in November 2008 in a friendly game and won only after a big effort. The final result, 3-0, was misleading. Chile played a phenomenal first half, particularly in pressing Spain in the midfield. Brilliant job, really. Chile missed two very clear scoring opportunities, the first one when the game was 0 - 0, and received two silly goals against, one after a dumb penalty and another one after the ball hit the back of a Chilean defender
Chile also run an excellent qualifying tournament for the World Cup 2010. It qualified second after Brasil.
Chile vs. Spain is the last game of Group H. By the time they meet, both teams may have been qualified for the next round. By then it will be also known for sure how Brazil did in its group. Mind you that the winner of Brazil group will play the second of group H (probably either Chile or Spain), and vice-versa. Spain may very well play with its B team against Chile, just as it did in the Euro2008 against Greece. This gave some very necessary rest to the A team as it kept in good shape and highly motivated the B players. If Spain plays with its A team, Chile can still beat Spain. If Spain plays with its B team, it is even more possible. Thus Chile may very well qualify first of Group H, and Spain may have to play Brazil in the first play-off.
Watch Chile. It may go far into the play-offs. It does not play Spain´s associative foothball, but it plays excellent football too.
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